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Artificial grammar learning (AGL) performance reflects both implicit and explicit 
processes and has typically been modeled without incorporating any influence from 
general world knowledge. Our research provides a systematic investigation of the 
implicit vs. explicit nature of general knowledge and its interaction with knowledge 
types investigated by past AGL research (i.e., rule- and similarity-based knowledge). In 
an AGL experiment, a general knowledge manipulation involved expectations being 
either congruent or incongruent with training stimulus structure. Inconsistent 
observations paradoxically led to an advantage in structural knowledge and in the use of 
general world knowledge in both explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) cases 
(as assessed by subjective measures). The above findings were obtained under 
conditions of reduced processing time and impaired executive resources. Κey findings 
from our work are that implicit AGL can clearly be affected by general knowledge, and 
implicit learning can be enhanced by the violation of expectations. 
















The present work uses the AGL paradigm to explore the effect of prior 
knowledge on (implicit and explicit) learning. Most AGL studies use meaningless 
stimuli, devoid of any correspondence with prior knowledge. Moreover, the majority of 
AGL models reference only the structural aspects of stimuli (e.g., Boucher & Dienes, 
2003; Cleeremans, 1993a, 1993b; Dienes, Altmann & Gao, 1999; Servan-Schreiber & 
Anderson, 1990; but see Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Sun, 2000). Extending the AGL 
paradigm to a knowledge-rich version is crucial in determining whether AGL theory can 
extend to more realistic learning conditions and whether AGL tasks can be employed to 
shed light on how general knowledge can influence cognitive processes. 
In a typical AGL experiment (e.g., Dulany, Carlson & Dewey, 1984; Reber, 
1967; Reber & Allen, 1978), participants first study a list of letter strings generated by a 
finite state grammar and are asked to simply observe them or memorize them. After 
training, they are informed that the strings followed a complex set of rules, but no 
specific information is provided regarding the nature of the rules. Then, they are asked 
to classify new letter strings, half of which are consistent with the rules and are thus 
called grammatical (G) and half of which are not consistent with the rules and are called 
non-grammatical (NG). No corrective feedback is provided in the test phase.  
Replacing the letter strings in the standard AGL paradigm with meaningful 
stimuli (e.g., sequences of cities), without any more elaborate prior knowledge 
manipulation, does not seem to alter performance (Pothos, Chater & Ziori, 2006). 
Pothos (2005, Experiment 2) used sequences of cities and also manipulated the 
consistency of stimulus structure with instructions given to participants, to induce 
different expectations about the stimuli. In his relevant experiment, the stimuli were 
sequences of cities that corresponded to the routes of a salesman. In one condition, 




stimulus structure was consistent with participants’ expectations from the instructions 
(that the salesman should make as many short trips as possible), whereas in the other it 
was not. When stimulus structure was inconsistent with expectations, performance was 
impaired. At the very least, the study of Pothos (2005) shows that expectations about 
stimulus structure can affect AGL performance. However, Pothos (2005) used only a 
simple incidental learning condition and measured AGL performance only in terms of 
grammaticality accuracy. Further, Pothos did not employ any measures of the 
implicitness of the acquired knowledge. The present work extends Pothos’s (2005) 
study, to explore the generality of his findings. In particular, we disentangle three 
knowledge types, namely general knowledge relations that are consistent or inconsistent 
with people’s expectations and two purely structural aspects (i.e., grammaticality and 
similarity). We also use subjective measures of implicitness, to examine the implicit or 
explicit nature of each knowledge type, under different learning conditions.  
1.1 Key Features of AGL 
A key aspect of AGL tasks concerns stimulus construction. Consider, for 
example, Figure 1, which presents the grammar employed in the present experiment.  
********************* 
insert Figure 1 about here 
********************* 
In going from left to right, a set of G strings are created, as opposed to NG 
strings. The distinction between G and NG sequences is referred to as ‘grammaticality’. 
Crucially, the relation between the training and test stimuli is not limited to the grammar 
rules per se: For example, some test items will have bigrams (pairs of symbols) or 
trigrams (triplets of symbols), which are familiar from training (Perruchet & Pacteau, 
1990; Knowlton & Squire, 1996).  




There has been a flourishing research tradition and divergent hypotheses on 
what is learned in AGL, including rules, whole item similarity and similarity based on 
chunk overlap (e.g., Dulany et al., 1984; Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Perruchet & 
Pacteau 1990; Reber, 1967, 1989; Vokey & Brooks, 1992; see Pothos, 2007 for a 
review). For example, apart from grammaticality, a common measure that has been used 
in AGL is Knowlton and Squire’s (1996) chunk strength index. Chunk strength is 
estimated by averaging the frequency, with which all chunks (i.e., bigrams or trigrams) 
of each test item occurred during training (cf. Meulemans & van der Linder, 1997). 
When grammaticality and chunk strength are carefully balanced, as is the case in the 
present work, the former can be thought to constitute more rule-like knowledge (in the 
sense that it does not depend on frequency, at least of chunks) and the latter more 
similarity-like knowledge. Henceforth, when we say grammaticality we will imply rule-
like knowledge over and above the frequency-dependent distributional characteristics of 
chunks, and when we refer to similarity we will imply Knowlton and Squire’s (1996) 
chunk-strength index. 
AGL has also been widely used in the implicit learning literature. The issue of 
the implicitness of knowledge has been hotly debated (e.g., Dulany, 2003; Shanks & St. 
John, 1994; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). In this work, we adopt a general definition, 
according to which implicit learning refers to learning without the need for intention 
(i.e., it can be passive), and results in knowledge that has some content not directly 
available to conscious introspection (for a review of conscious vs. unconscious 
processes see Norman, 2010).  
During testing in AGL tasks, participants may rely on any type of structural 
knowledge (e.g., bigrams, rules, whole items) they acquired during training. In this 
study, the implicitness of the structural knowledge was assessed with Dienes and 




Scott’s (2005) method, which asks participants to specify the basis of their 
classifications, by choosing among different knowledge attributions (e.g., intuition, 
memory; Guo et al., 2011; Hamrick & Rebuschat, 2012; Neil & Higham, 2012; Norman 
& Price, 2012). These attributions allowed us to assess whether, when each of our three 
knowledge types (i.e., general knowledge relations, grammaticality, chunk strength) 
influenced participants’ judgments, there was explicit (conscious) knowledge of what 
that structure was or that it was a particular structure motivating the judgment.  
AGL research has led to conflicting arguments regarding the 
implicitness/explicitness of similarity and grammaticality, with some researchers 
(Chang & Knowlton, 2004; Higham, 1997) associating similarity-based learning with 
an intentional, conscious and effortful process and the learning of grammaticality with a 
more automatic and passive process, and others (Pothos & Wood, 2009) suggesting the 
opposite. With respect to the implicitness of general knowledge relations, different 
views have also been proposed. On one view, theory-based knowledge is considered 
explicit (e.g., McRae, 2004; Pothos, 2005; Sloman, 1996). On this view, we would 
expect general knowledge relations in the present study to be associated with explicit 
knowledge. On other views, the influence of prior knowledge may be considered as the 
influence of prior exemplars (Heit, 1994), and, thus, might include some implicit 
memories. Most importantly, the implicitness results would bear on the important 
debate of whether prior knowledge is an unselective and passive process with no room 
for possible interpretative biases (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988) or it is a selective process 
(van den Bos & Poletiek, 2009) that can interact with expectations (e.g., Sun, Merrill, & 
Peterson, 2001; Sun, 2000; Ziori & Dienes, 2008). 
In sum, the present work aims to explore AGL performance, by disentangling 
three different knowledge types (i.e., grammaticality, similarity and one that reflected 




general knowledge) and examining their implicit or explicit nature. We so hope to 
provide a clearer picture of the effect of prior knowledge on AGL performance.  
1.2 The Effect of Prior Knowledge on Learning 
The effect of prior knowledge on learning has been ignored in AGL research. By 
contrast, in categorization research, the possibly profound influence of general 
knowledge on performance has been widely appreciated (Harris, Murphy & Rehder, 
2008; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Kaplan & Murphy, 2000; Murphy & Kaplan, 2000; 
Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987; Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989; Pazzani, 1991; 
Wattenmaker, Dewey, Murphy, & Medin, 1986; Wisniewski, 1995).    
A clear conclusion from the bulk of categorization research is that congruency of 
prior knowledge with stimulus structure, typically, facilitates learning. What is less 
clear is what happens when prior knowledge is incongruent with the stimuli. According 
to conflict monitoring theory (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Verguts & Notebaert, 2009), when a stimulus or a situation involves conflict, the 
cognitive system allocates more attentional resources to adapt to the relevant situation, 
which, in turn, reduces the influence of irrelevant information. According to the 
predictive coding approach, stimuli are coded precisely in terms of the extent to which 
they violate expectations (Clark, 2013). Similarly, in categorization research, Heit 
(1998) found that, under slow-paced learning, observations incongruent with prior 
knowledge affected categorization more than congruent observations did. Conversely, 
Pothos (2005) found that incongruence of prior knowledge with stimulus structure 
impaired AGL grammaticality performance.  
We aim to test the generality of Pothos’s (2005) conclusion, by examining how 
prior knowledge affects grammaticality together with other knowledge types, and under 
different learning conditions. The guiding question is this: Does incongruence of prior 




knowledge with structure interfere with performance of all or some knowledge types 
and under all or specific learning conditions?   
1.3 Logic of the Current Investigation  
As in Pothos (2005), the current AGL task employed sequences of city names as 
stimuli, but we also extend this work in several ways. Training stimuli were constructed 
to embody an association between high-frequency bigrams and shorter inter-city 
distances and were the same for all participants. A knowledge type that characterized 
stimuli, the so-called ‘distance’ factor, was computed from an approximate 
consideration of whether the city transitions in each test stimulus corresponded to 
shorter or longer distances. Performance on this factor reflected participants’ prior 
(geographical) knowledge. A key experimental condition concerned instructions that 
elicited different expectations about the stimuli. Participants were told that the stimuli 
were routes of an airline company and it was stated that it was advantageous for the 
company to either make more trips to nearby cities (the consistent condition) or to far 
cities (the inconsistent condition). In the consistent condition, distance accuracy 
reflected the degree to which participants endorsed more short-distance items, in line 
with both their expectations (derived from the cover story) and the training stimulus 
structure (which reflected shorter inter-city distances). Conversely, in the inconsistent 
condition, distance accuracy reflected the degree to which participants endorsed more 
long-distance items over short-distance ones, in line with the expectations induced from 
the cover story, but at odds with the training stimulus structure. By comparing 
performance in these two conditions, we can examine how the congruency or 
incongruency of prior knowledge can affect learning (cf. Pothos, 2005, who provided 
the same instructions to all participants, but manipulated stimulus structure, to be 
consistent or inconsistent with expectations).  




Our test stimuli were balanced along three knowledge factors, the distance 
factor, grammaticality, and similarity (as chunk strength). This design illustrates how 
our AGL task extends Pothos’s (2005) work and goes beyond similar work in 
categorization, as, in the present work, performance during testing can be influenced by 
three theoretically-relevant performance factors, which are pairwise (nearly) orthogonal 
to each other. By contrast, Pothos (2005) assessed performance only in terms of 
grammaticality (and only in a baseline learning condition). 
Another innovation of our work concerns the inclusion of two learning 
conditions, beyond the baseline one. The first condition was time pressure, whereby 
exposure to the training stimuli was greatly reduced. This condition allows us to 
distinguish between performance factors that require time to develop and ones that do 
not. For example, perceptual categorization research has shown that the application of 
background knowledge can be fast (Lin & Murphy, 1997; Luhmann, Ahn, & Palmeri, 
2006; Palmeri & Blalock, 2000). Other researchers (Sloman, 1996; Smith & Sloman, 
1994) equate knowledge-based categorization with rule-based processing, which they 
consider as time and effort demanding and contrast it with similarity-based 
categorization, which they consider automatic. Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002) 
suggested that representations become explicit depending on their quality and that one 
factor affecting quality is stability in time. Thus, on this view, under time pressure, we 
expect performance to involve mostly implicit knowledge (cf. Mealor & Dienes, 2012; 
but see Mealor & Dienes, 2013).  
The second learning condition was a concurrent task (a working memory load) 
in training. A straightforward assumption is that such tasks engage executive control 
(Baddeley, 2007; Baddeley & Andrade, 1998; Shelton, Elliott, & Cowan, 2008). 
Accordingly, if a performance factor is not affected by the concurrent task, then we can 




infer that the supporting process does not require executive resources and is so more 
automatic (Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Shapiro, 1989). Moreover, various 
investigators have shown that a concurrent task is more likely to interfere with explicit 
learning, than with implicit learning (e.g., Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; 
Dienes & Scott, 2005; Roberts & MacLeod, 1995; Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Ziori & 
Dienes, 2008; contrast Shanks & Channon, 2002).  
In sum, our work derives from Pothos’s (2005) study, but provides several key 
extensions allowing the study of different knowledge factors, the 
implicitness/explicitness of the acquired knowledge, and the dependence of learning on 
time pressure and a concurrent task. We thus hope to provide a more comprehensive 
examination of the complex issue of how prior knowledge affects learning. 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants/Design 
The experiment involved two between-participants conditions, consistency 
(consistent vs. inconsistent) and training (baseline, time pressure and dual/concurrent 
task). One hundred and eighty participants, mostly undergraduate students at the 
University of Ioannina, Greece, were randomly assigned to one of the six training cells. 
The training stimuli were sequences of city names that corresponded to the routes of an 
airline company. Participants in both the consistent and the inconsistent conditions were 
presented with the same stimuli. However, instructions (and related general knowledge) 
were congruent with training stimulus structure in the consistent condition, and 
incongruent in the inconsistent condition. 
2.2 Materials  
Stimulus generation was based on a deterministic version of Reber and Allen’s 
(1978) classic grammar. Stimuli had a length between three and seven city names. We 




used Bailey and Pothos’ (2008) algorithm for generating AGL stimuli. There were 20 
training items, and 40 test items, which were new (i.e., they had not been seen during 
training). Half of the test items were G and the other half NG. Chunk strength, which 
was based on Knowlton & Squire’s (1996) index, was well counterbalanced in our 
stimulus set: The mean chunk strength of G and NG items were 4.25 (SD = 1.46) and 
4.20 (SD = 1.13) respectively, resulting in a non-significant difference, p = .90, ηp2 
<.0011. Test items were ordered according to their chunk strength; there were 20 high-
chunk strength items and 20 low-chunk strength items. The average chunk strength of 
the low-chunk strength items was 3.12 (SD = 0.51) and of the high-chunk strength items 
5.33 (SD = 0.74), a significant difference, t(38) = 10.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .76. Chunk 
strength values conformed roughly to a bimodal distribution, hence making the 
classification of test items into high/low chunk strength ones meaningful (Figure 2).  
********************* 
insert Figure 2 about here 
********************* 
Apart from the two purely structural factors of grammaticality and chunk 
strength, we also created a general knowledge factor, the ‘distance factor’. We sought to 
identify a mapping between the symbols of the grammar and city names, such that more 
frequent training bigrams would correspond to cities closer together. It is in this way 
that the training items can be said to ‘make sense’ or not relative to the general 
(geographical) knowledge of participants and the added instructions that more frequent 
                                                 
1
 P values are reported here and elsewhere when characterizing the properties of 
the items, according to convention, but as the items used constituted the population, 
there is no statistical generalization to be made. 




trips between nearby cities (in the consistent condition) or between far away cities (in 
the inconsistent condition) were advantageous.  
To create the distance factor, we first created a similarity matrix for all the 
symbols of the grammar (for brevity, we represent these as in the original Reber & 
Allen, 1978, study, as M, S, R, V, and X). To do so, we computed the frequency of 
bigrams in training items (Table 1) and the matrix entries corresponded to this 
information. For example, the frequency of bigram MS in training would be 10, 
therefore, this was the value in the corresponding entry in the similarity matrix. Bigram 
frequencies ranged between one and fourteen. We filled in the matrix elements as much 
as possible using distributional information from training, but five of the possible 
bigrams did not appear in training.  
********************* 
insert Table 1 about here 
*********************       
The value of each cell was subtracted from 14 (i.e., the maximum bigram 
frequency), so as to create a distance matrix from the similarity matrix, such that high 
bigram frequencies would be associated with short distances. Further, we assigned the 
value 0 to all the bigrams made of the same symbol (MM, SS etc.), since such bigrams 
should correspond to least distance. The missing cells were completed in either of two 
ways: First, if there was a distance for cell AB, but not BA, we set the value for BA to 
be the same as the value for AB (in cases where there was a value for AB different to 
BA, we replaced both values with their average). Second, where there was neither an 
AB value nor a BA one, we set both values to 7 (the median distance). In this way, we 
managed to create a distance matrix out of bigram frequencies, such that, in general, 
more frequent bigrams corresponded to shorter inter-city distances.  




In order to provide a two-dimensional representation of the pattern of distances, 
we carried out a multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis (Shepard, 1980). The MDS 
of the above distance matrix revealed a satisfactory (stress =.003, RSQ = .999) two-
dimensional representation of the letters in the grammar (Figure 3). Of course, the two 
dimensions cannot be interpreted in terms of any aspect of the grammar.  
********************* 
insert Figure 3 about here 
********************* 
Using this MDS representation of the letters (Figure 3), we assigned a distance 
‘value’ to each bigram, to examine the relation of the distance factor to grammaticality 
and chunk strength. Table 1 shows these results and allows an appreciation of how 
successful the conversion of bigram frequencies to MDS distances has been: Overall, 
most of the frequent bigrams are indeed associated with shorter distances, but with 
some exceptions.  
 Given the Table 1 association between distances and bigrams, we computed the 
distance factor for each test item. We assigned distance values of 0, 1, or 2 to each 
bigram, depending on whether the bigram corresponded to a short, intermediate, or long 
distance. Then, we computed the overall distance associated with a test item, by simply 
adding the distances corresponding to the bigrams of the test items. For example, 
consider test item MSVS. Its ‘distance’ can be found by adding the distance values for 
MS, SV, and VS, which is 0 + 1 + 1 = 2. The distance factor for the G and NG test 
items is shown in Table A1. Given the approximations involved in computing these 
distance values, we simply ordered the test items on the basis of distance and called 23 
of them ‘high distance’ and 17 ‘low distance’ (it was not possible to exactly equate the 
number of low and high distance items). Note that a dichotomous use of the distance 




variable takes into account our expectation that, at best, our participants’ knowledge of 
geography would be approximate.  
A key issue is whether the distance factor correlates with grammaticality or 
chunk strength. In both cases the answer is negative (for these correlations we used the 
continuous distance and chunk strength factors, not the dichotomized ones). The 
correlation with grammaticality was r(40) = -.013, and with chunk strength was r(40) = 
.058. Thus, the distance factor is largely independent of grammaticality and chunk 
strength. This conclusion is reinforced by comparing the distance factor for G and NG 
test items (4.85 vs. 4.90 respectively) and high and low chunk strength items (4.90 vs. 
4.85 respectively). In sum, if participants were responding, predominantly, on the basis 
of distance, we would expect very low grammaticality and chunk strength performance.  
 The final issue concerned how to map letters to city names. First, we needed an 
arrangement of cities, which would conform as closely as possible to the arrangement of 
letters in Figure 3. Second, the cities had to be such that their geographical locations 
would be broadly familiar to participants. Thus, we mapped the letters to the following 
European cities, that were expected to be familiar to our Greek participants: M was 
mapped to Nicosia, S to Athens, V to Berlin, R to London, and X to Lisbon. This 
mapping between letters and city names captures the two-dimensional MDS 
representation of the letters in the grammar satisfactorily (Figure 4). 
********************* 
insert Figure 4 about here 
********************* 
There was not a significant difference in the actual geographical distance 
between G (7047kms, SD = 2673) and NG (8203kms, SD = 2754) or between high 
(8016kms, SD = 2455) and low chunk strength (7234kms, SD = 3014) strings (p = .186, 




ηp2 = .05 and p = .374, ηp2 = .02 respectively). By contrast, there was a significant 
difference in geographical distance between short (5198kms, SD = 1574) and long-
distance (9418kms, SD = 1901) strings, p < .001, ηp2 = .59, in the expected direction. 
The average geographical distance for training items was 6683kms (SD = 2776), closer 
to the short-distance (p = .059, ηp2 = .10) than to the long-distance test strings (p < .001, 
ηp2= .26), as intended. In sum, the grammaticality and similarity structures in the test 
phase did not conform to or violate distance expectations in themselves; rather, it is the 
relation of the cover task to training items that was congruent or incongruent with 
expectations. 
2.3 Procedure and Tasks 
All participants were informed that the study consisted of two parts. In the first 
part, they had to observe sequences of cities that corresponded to the routes of an airline 
company. Learning was incidental, in that participants did not know that (or what) they 
were supposed to learn, nor that they were going to be tested.  
2.3.1 Exposure phase 
The two consistency conditions differed in terms of the cover stories given to 
participants, which favored more short-distance trips in the consistent condition and 
more long-distance ones in the inconsistent one (Appendix B).  
The training strings of city names were individually presented on a computer 
screen. In the baseline learning condition, each string remained on the screen until 
participants pressed the space bar to move on to the next string (presentation time was 
limited to a maximum of 30s). Participants were asked to press the space bar as quickly 
as possible. Training items were presented three times, with a different random order 
each time, such that no item was presented n+ 1 times before all items had been 
presented n times. 




In the dual task condition, we employed a random number generation (RNG) 
task that is known to engage executive function (Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & 
Duncan, 1998; Towse, 1998; Towse & Chesire, 2007). Throughout training, participants 
had to generate a random number between 1 and 10, guided by the beats of an electronic 
metronome, at the rate of 40 beats per minute. Participants were corrected if they did 
not keep pace with the metronome or did not produce apparently random sequences. 
Under time pressure training, strings appeared for a short time that was set on 
the basis of string length, with strings containing seven, six, five, four and three city 
names appearing on the screen for 1200ms, 1000ms, 800ms, 650ms and 500ms, 
respectively. 
2.3.2 Test phase    
After training, participants were asked to determine which of the new sequences 
were compatible with the old ones and which were not (Appendix B provides verbatim 
instructions). The test strings of city names were presented individually and remained 
on the screen until participants pressed either of two keys labeled “yes” or “no”. Each 
string was presented once with no corrective feedback.  
Following each response, participants had to specify the source of their 
knowledge by pressing one of the following keys labeled: guess, intuition, implicit prior 
knowledge, explicit prior knowledge, rules, or memory. Participants were given the 
following instructions: Press the ‘guess’ key when it seems to you that your response is 
based on no information whatsoever, that is, when you feel as if your response was 
decided by the flipping of a coin. Press the ‘intuition’ key when you are, to some extent, 
confident about your response and its correctness, but you have no idea why your 
judgment is correct. Press the ‘implicit prior knowledge’ key when it seems to you that 
your judgment was not based on any knowledge you acquired during the first part, but 




rather on pre-existing knowledge about cities, which, however, you could not specify 
and report if required. Press the ‘explicit prior knowledge’ key when it seems to you 
that your judgment was not based on any knowledge you acquired during the first part, 
but rather on pre-existing knowledge about cities, which you could specify and report if 
required. Press the ‘rules’ key when it seems to you that your judgment was based on a 
rule or some rules you learned in the first part, and which you could report if asked. 
Press the ‘memory’ category key when it seems to you that your judgment was based on 
memory for specific routes or parts of routes from the first part. 
The first three categories correspond to structural knowledge, the content of 
which participants claim to be unaware of, and the last three to structural knowledge, 
the content of which participants claim to be aware of. Thus, the first three categories 
were considered as indices of implicit structural knowledge, whereas the last three as 
indices of, at least partially, explicit structural knowledge (for use of such attributions 
see e.g., Grey, Williams, & Rebuschat, in press; Dienes, 2012; Dienes, Baddeley, & 
Jansari, 2012; Dienes & Scott, 2005; Li, Jiang, Guo, Yang, & Dienes, 2013; Rebuschat, 
Hamrick, Sachs, Riestenberg, & Ziegler, 2013; Williams & Rebuschat, 2012). 
2.3.3 Post experimental session  
After the test phase, all participants answered a question regarding their 
geographical knowledge of our cities. It was noted that this question was independent of 
the experimental session. All 25 pairs of cities used to create the stimuli were presented, 
individually, on the computer screen. Participants had to provide an estimate of how 
long the distance between the two cities seemed to them, by pressing one of the three 
keys: short, medium, long. 
3. Results 




Performance in terms of the three knowledge types (grammaticality, similarity, 
distance) is used to assess whether learning took place. Performance on subjective 
measures is used to establish whether training resulted in implicit (unconscious) or 
explicit (conscious) knowledge of the three possible knowledge kinds. 
3.1 Classification Performance  
Given we have employed a knowledge type (distance), different from the kind of 
knowledge types investigated in past AGL research, we analyzed each knowledge type 
separately, using two-way ANOVAs, with consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent) and 
training (baseline, time pressure, dual task), as between-participants variables2. This 
allows an examination of the impact of the key manipulation, regarding the consistency 
of knowledge, on each of the three knowledge types, and across the three training 
conditions.  
In terms of grammaticality, a consistency by training interaction, F(2, 174) = 
4.02, p = .020, ηp2 = .04, revealed that participants in the consistent condition 
significantly outperformed those in the inconsistent condition in the baseline learning 
condition only, F(1, 58) = 9.33, p = .003, ηp2 = .14, with evidence of grammaticality 
knowledge being found in the consistent condition, r2 = .49, but not the inconsistent one 
r
2
 = .03 (Table 2). This was effectively the conclusion of Pothos (2005). In the time 
pressure and dual task conditions, there were no significant differences in 
grammaticality performance between the consistent and inconsistent conditions, F(1, 
58) = .64, p = .426, ηp2 = .01, 95% CI [-6.22, 2.66] and F(1, 58) = .65, p = .422, ηp2 = 
.01, 95% CI [-2.6, 6.1], respectively. Evidence of grammaticality knowledge in the two 
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 The 3-way interaction was not significant. No conclusions will be drawn about 
differences between the knowledge types, where not tested and analogously for related 
cases. 




consistency conditions collapsed together was found in the dual task condition (55%, p 
< .001, r2 = .23) and not under time pressure (51%, p = .662, r2 = .003), a difference 
which was significant, F(1, 116) = 6.94, p =. 010, ηp2 = .06.   
******************** 
insert Table 2 about here 
********************  
In terms of (chunk strength) similarity, a consistency by training  interaction, 
F(2, 174) = 4.99, p = .008, ηp2 = .05, revealed a clear advantage of the inconsistent over 
the consistent condition under time pressure, F(1, 58) = 15.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, with 
only the former condition demonstrating evidence of similarity knowledge in this 
training type (Table 2). There was not a significant consistency effect for either 
baseline, F(1, 58) = 1.60, p = .211, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [-7.1, 1.6], or dual task conditions, 
F(1, 58) = .40, p = .532, ηp2 = .01, 95% CI [-2.8, 5.3]. Evidence of similarity knowledge 
in the two consistency conditions collapsed together was found in the baseline condition 
(55%, p < .001, r2 = .26), but not in the dual task one (51%, p = .176, r2 = .03), a 
difference which was significant, F(1, 116) = 5.90, p = .017, ηp2 = .05.   
Finally, we compare participants’ performance on the distance factor. Recall, in 
all cases, higher performance on the distance factor was a measure of selections 
consistent with participants’ expectations, but in the consistent condition these 
expectations were further consistent with the structure of the stimuli, whereas this was 
not the case in the inconsistent condition. There was only a significant effect of 
consistency, F(1,174) = 7.38, p = .007, ηp2 = .04, with overall distance accuracy being 
significantly higher in the inconsistent than in the consistent condition, irrespective of 
training type. Evidence of distance knowledge collapsed across training types was 
found in both the consistent condition (54%, p = .006, r2 = .08) and the inconsistent 




condition (58%, p < .001, r2 = .35). Note that, although pre-existing biases might 
explain the difference between the consistent and inconsistent conditions for any one 
training condition, differences between training conditions cannot be so explained.   
To sum up, in many cases, performance in the inconsistent condition was higher 
than in the consistent condition. This was the case for the distance factor, independent 
of training condition, and for similarity under time pressure. However, for baseline 
learning, grammaticality performance was higher in the consistent condition.  
3.2 Subjective Measures of Awareness 
The analysis of the conscious status of participants’ structural knowledge was 
used to examine what sorts of information (distance relations, grammaticality or 
similarity) led to explicit and implicit knowledge.  
3.2.1 Frequency of knowledge attributions 
The frequencies of the different knowledge attributions are shown in Table 3. 
The guess, intuition and implicit prior knowledge categories were combined to create 
implicit attribution scores, and the three explicit attributions were combined to create 
explicit attribution scores. The two-way ANOVA on percentage of implicit attributions 
in the two consistency conditions and the three training conditions revealed a significant 
effect of training, F(2,174) = 24.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. An LSD post hoc test revealed 
that each training type differed from the other two, ps < .05, with baseline learning 
resulting in the lowest frequency of implicit attributions (31%), dual task leading to the 
highest frequency (61%), and time pressure lying in between (44%).   
******************** 
insert Table 3 about here 
******************** 




An effect of consistency, F(1, 174) = 5.37, p = .022, ηp2 = .03, showed that, in 
the consistent condition, participants gave fewer implicit attributions (41%) than in the 
inconsistent condition (49%). 
In sum, baseline learning led to the lowest and dual task to the highest number 
of attributions indicating implicit knowledge. In addition, the inconsistent condition led 
to more implicit attributions than the consistent one.  
3.2.2 The implicitness and explicitness of knowledge 
The accuracy of the implicit attributions (i.e., accuracy for items included in the 
implicit attribution scores) was assessed with three 2-way ANOVAs on participants’ 
accuracy while providing implicit attributions for each knowledge type, with 
consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent) and training (baseline, time pressure, dual 
task), as between-participants variables. The accuracy of the explicit attributions (i.e., 
accuracy for items included in the explicit attribution scores) was assessed with 
corresponding ANOVAs for explicit attributions (Table 4)3.  
********************* 
insert Table 4 about here 
********************* 
3.2.2.1 Implicit knowledge  
With respect to grammaticality, there were no significant effects (ps > .05, ηp2s < 
.03) and the consistency by training interaction reached only marginal significance, F(2, 
169) = 3.00, p = .053, ηp2 = .03. The overall accuracy of implicit grammaticality 
knowledge (52%) was close to chance, p = .167, r2 = .01, 95% CI [49.3, 54.2].  
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 Only the 3-way interaction for the accuracy of implicit knowledge was 
significant (F(4, 338) = 2.58, p = .037, ηp2 = .03).  




No significant effects or interactions were found in terms of similarity, either, ps 
> .10, ηp2s < .03. However, the overall accuracy of implicit similarity knowledge (53%) 
exceeded chance, t(174) = 1.99, p = .048, r2 = .02.  
In terms of the distance factor, there was a consistency by training interaction, 
F(2, 169) = 5.31, p = .006, ηp2 = .06. The consistent and inconsistent conditions did not 
differ in terms of the accuracy of implicit distance knowledge under the baseline 
condition, F(1, 57) = 1.95, p = .168, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [-3.2, 18.1]. The overall accuracy 
of implicit distance knowledge in the two conditions collapsed together was close to 
chance, p = .384, r2 = .01, 95% CI [47.0, 57.7]. By contrast, under time pressure, the 
inconsistent condition demonstrated significantly greater accuracy of implicit distance 
knowledge than the consistent condition, F(1, 55) = 7.63, p = .008, ηp2 = .12. In fact, 
evidence of implicit distance knowledge under time pressure was found only in the 
inconsistent, r2 = .39, and not in the consistent condition, p = .489, r2 = .02, 95% CI 
[39.4, 55.2]. Similarly, in the dual task condition, the inconsistent condition 
outperformed the consistent one in terms of the accuracy of implicit distance 
knowledge, F(1, 57) = 4.05, p = .049, ηp2 = .07, which again exceeded chance only in 
the former, r2 = .14, and not in the latter condition, p = .543, r2 = .01, 95% CI [45.1, 
52.7].  
In sum, there was evidence only of implicit knowledge of similarity and not of 
grammaticality, independent of consistency and training conditions. With respect to the 
distance factor, baseline learning did not elicit any implicit knowledge, independent of 
consistency condition. By contrast, time pressure and dual task led to the development 
of implicit distance knowledge, but only in the inconsistent and not in the consistent 
condition.   
3.2.2.2 Explicit knowledge  




In terms of the accuracy of explicit grammaticality knowledge, there were no 
significant effects or interactions, ps > .05, ηp2s < .04. The overall accuracy of explicit 
grammaticality knowledge collapsed over conditions (54%) exceeded chance, p < .001, 
r
2
 = .08.  
With respect to similarity, there was a significant consistency by training 
interaction, F(2, 169) = 3.77, p = .025, ηp2 = .04. There was no difference between the 
consistent and inconsistent conditions in terms of accuracy of explicit similarity 
knowledge, F(1, 58) = 2.53, p = .117, ηp2 = .04, 95% CI [-10.8, 1.2], under baseline 
training, with the corresponding accuracy collapsed over the two consistency conditions 
(58%) exceeding chance, p < .001, r2 = .34. Under time pressure, the inconsistent 
condition outperformed the consistent condition, F(1, 56) = 16.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, 
with accuracy of explicit similarity knowledge significantly exceeding chance only in 
the former, r2 = .41, and not in the latter condition, p = .335, r2 = .03, 95% CI [43.9, 
52.1] (see Table 4). Under dual task learning, there was no significant difference in 
explicit similarity knowledge between the consistent and inconsistent conditions, F(1, 
55) < .001, p = .987, ηp2 < .001, 95% CI [-8.5, 8.7]. Explicit similarity knowledge 
collapsed over the two consistency conditions under dual task training (56%) exceeded 
chance, p = .007, r2 = .12.  
In terms of distance, the inconsistent condition outperformed the consistent one, 
F(1, 169) = 8.52, p = .004, ηp2 = .05, independent of training, with accuracy of explicit 
distance knowledge significantly exceeding chance only in the former (62%), p < .001, 
r
2
 = .34, and not in the latter condition (54%), p = .088, r2 = .03, 95% CI [49.5, 57.7]. 
In sum, there was evidence of explicit grammaticality knowledge in all 
conditions collapsed together. There was above chance explicit similarity knowledge in 
the two consistency conditions, under baseline and dual task conditions. However, the 




inconsistent condition was the only condition that led to significant explicit similarity 
knowledge under time pressure. An analogous advantage of the inconsistent over the 
consistent condition was found in terms of explicit distance knowledge, independent of 
training type.          
3.3 Post Experimental Question 
The post experimental question assessed participants’ knowledge of geography, 
by asking them to rate if trips between two cities corresponded to short, medium or long 
distances. Scores of 0, 1 and 2 corresponded to short, medium and long distances, 
respectively. The 2 X 3 X 3 (Consistency [consistent vs. inconsistent] X Training 
[baseline vs. time pressure vs. dual task] X Distance [short vs. medium vs. long]) 
ANOVA showed that only distance, F(2, 348) = 905.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .84, and its 
interaction with training, F(4, 348) = 3.90, p = .004, ηp2 = .05, were significant. The 
three training conditions differed only in terms of short-distance (F(2,174) = 4.78, p = 
.010, ηp2 = .05) and long-distance items (F(2,174) = 3.37, p = .037, ηp2 = .04), and not in 
terms of the medium ones (F(2,174) = .54, p = .582, ηp2 = .01). An LSD post hoc test 
revealed a difference between baseline and the other two conditions in terms of the 
short- and long-distance items (ps < .05), with participants in the baseline condition 
giving lower scores for the short-distance items and higher scores for the long-distance 
ones than did participants in the other two training conditions. This finding does not add 
any useful information to our main question of interest concerning participants’ ability 
to distinguish between the different distances, which would indicate good geography 
knowledge. The important finding is that the effect of distance was significant in all 
training conditions (baseline: F(2, 116) = 436.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .88, time pressure: F(2, 
116) = 240.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .81, dual task: F(2, 116) = 261.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .82), 
with all three distance means differing significantly from each other and in the expected 




direction in all training types (all ps < .001). In particular, short-distance bigrams 
received the lowest score (baseline: M = .26, SD =.18, time pressure: M = .38, SD = .25, 
dual task: M = .35, SD = .21), long-distance bigrams received the highest score 
(baseline: M = 1.54, SD =.24, time pressure: M = 1.44, SD = .26, dual task: M = 1.42, 
SD = .32) and medium bigrams fell between these (baseline: M = 1.02, SD = .39, time 
pressure: M = 1.10, SD = .39, dual task: M = 1.05, SD = .36). Thus, participants had 
knowledge of geography in all training conditions. 
4. General Discussion 
Our aim was to investigate how (in)congruence of prior knowledge with 
stimulus structure affects a) the learning of the novel distance knowledge type involving 
prior knowledge relations, and b) the learning of purely structural knowledge that has 
been used in past AGL research (i.e., grammaticality and similarity, as chunk strength). 
Pothos (2005) first employed a prior knowledge manipulation and reported that, under 
baseline learning conditions, when stimuli reflected only a single type of knowledge 
(grammaticality), consistency between prior knowledge and stimulus structure enhanced 
learning. We tested the generality of Pothos’s (2005) findings by using different training 
conditions (baseline, time pressure, dual task), examining performance in a refined way, 
with stimuli made to reflect three knowledge types (grammaticality, similarity, 
distance), and including manipulations to test for the implicit/explicit nature of the 
knowledge acquired.  
4.1 The Impact of the Consistent vs. Inconsistent Knowledge Manipulation in AGL  
In the baseline condition, which corresponded to that of Pothos (2005), we 
replicated his earlier finding, regarding grammaticality. The relevant grammaticality 
scores in the consistent and inconsistent conditions in Pothos (2005) were 60.2% and 
52.5%, and in our work they were 59% and 52%. However, the more comprehensive 




approach adopted in the present study revealed ways in which Pothos’s (2005) 
conclusion could not be generalized (in relation to other knowledge types and other 
learning circumstances).  
Inconsistency between general knowledge and structure led to an advantage in 
terms of distance knowledge (independent of training type) and also in the use of 
similarity (under time pressure). Higher performance of the consistent condition over 
the inconsistent one was observed for grammaticality in the baseline learning condition 
(as Pothos, 2005, found too). 
Conflict monitoring theory (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Verguts & Notebaert, 
2009) leads us to expect that the conflict between prior expectations and structural 
stimulus aspects in the inconsistent condition increased participants’ attention to 
distance information, leading to greater use of distance knowledge and to greater 
learning of chunks that could be defined as distances.   
Why should grammaticality knowledge be impaired in the inconsistent rather 
than consistent condition? In our materials, grammaticality was fully counterbalanced 
with chunk strength. Thus, plausibly, part of what constitutes grammaticality knowledge 
is knowledge of repetition patterns (Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Scott & Dienes, 2008); that 
is, which positions are repetitions of elements in which other positions (e.g., the last 
position being a repeat of whichever element is in the first, etc.). We determined the 
“global repetition structure” of each string (e.g., the letter strings MTTVMT and 
BAACBA both have global repetition structure 122312). Following the procedure of 
Scott and Dienes (2008), we determined the “global repetition proportion” of each test 
string, defined as the maximum proportion of a test string’s global repetition structure 
that appeared in full (uninterrupted) in any of the training strings. This proportion was 
substantially higher for grammatical strings (.86, SD = .14) vs. non-grammatical strings 




(.66, SD = .14), p < .001, ηp2 = .36; but was almost identical for high (.74, SD = .15) vs. 
low (.78, SD = .20) chunk strength strings, p = .543, ηp2 = .01, and also for short (.80, 
SD = .19) vs. long (.72, SD = .17) distance strings, p = .160, ηp2 = .05. Awareness of 
incongruency may focus attention on details and local structure, allowing small chunks 
to be learnt better, but global structure, like long-distance repetitions (e.g., 12341) to be 
learnt more poorly, as reflected in grammaticality knowledge (for the role of global vs 
local structure in implicit learning see Dienes et al., 2012; Fu, Dienes, Shang & Fu, 
2013; Kiyokawa, Dienes, Tanaka, Yamada & Crowe, 2012). We acknowledge that this 
is a post hoc explanation for our results, though it is testable perhaps involving 
methodologies especially designed for investigating the global local distinction (e.g., 
Kiyokawa et al., 2012).  
The increased distance factor performance in the inconsistent condition does not 
quite comply with Heit’s (1998) report, that observations incongruent with prior 
knowledge lead to an advantage in categorization over congruent observations, only 
under slow-paced learning (when more resources are available). By contrast, we found 
that incongruent observations led to an advantage, even under time pressure and dual 
task conditions. Further, this finding broadly resonates with reports that prior 
knowledge facilitates categorization even when only a few knowledge-related features 
are involved or even when categories contain information that is contradictory to prior 
knowledge (Kaplan & Murphy, 2000; Murphy & Kaplan, 2000). 
4.2 The Implicitness of Prior Knowledge and Purely Structural Relations 
The present research assessed the (un)consciousness of prior knowledge, as 
applied to AGL, by examining the (un)consciousness of knowledge for distance 
relations. We found evidence of both explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) 
distance knowledge. That is, prior knowledge involves both an explicit and an implicit 




component. The explicit component may involve recollecting inter-city distances. The 
implicit component may involve intuitions about the total distance of different items or 
implicit memories of previously encountered related trips.   
The present findings diverge from the proposal that implicit learning is a passive 
process leaving no room for theory-based processes (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988). 
Rather, our results are more consistent with the idea that implicit AGL reflects selective 
processes (van den Bos & Poletiek, 2009) and can be related to participants’ goals 
(Eitam, Schul & Hassin, 2009), domain-specific constraints (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; 
Leung & Williams, 2011; Rohrmeier & Cross, 2013), and motivational relevance 
(Eitam & Higgins, 2010). Relatedly, Tanaka, Kiyokawa, Yamada, Dienes and 
Shigemasu (2008) and Kiyokawa et al. (2012) have argued that implicit learning is 
sensitive to selective perceptual attention and to cultural expectations, respectively. In 
an analogous vein, we have shown that what one attends to when learning implicitly is 
clearly influenced by prior knowledge. 
Finally, we consider the (un)consciousness of the two purely structural factors. 
Similarity involved both implicit and explicit knowledge, under certain training and 
consistency conditions. Thus, similarity knowledge may involve both implicit and 
explicit knowledge. In terms of grammaticality, we found evidence only of explicit 
knowledge. Dienes and Longuet-Higgins (2004), Jiang et al. (2012), Kuhn and Dienes 
(2005), Li et al. (2013), Neil and Higham (2012), and Rebuschat and Williams (2009) 
obtained implicit knowledge of grammaticality independently of chunk similarity. Thus, 
it seems that, in general, both grammaticality and similarity knowledge can be learnt 
implicitly, depending on context. It is not the case that one should be regarded as 
implicit and the other as explicit (cf. Chang & Knowlton, 2004; Higham, 1997; Pothos 
& Wood, 2009). 




Overall, our findings suggest that prior knowledge relevant to a learning task can 
involve both an explicit and an implicit component and may co-exist with both explicit 
and implicit knowledge of purely structural aspects of the stimuli.        
4.3 Learning Under Time Pressure and Dual Task Conditions 
One interesting conclusion from the use of time pressure in this experiment is 
that the effect of prior knowledge on learning grammaticality requires a long enough 
exposure to the training strings (i.e., more than roughly a second per string). Similarity 
and distance knowledge could develop within about a second per string (as the above 
chance similarity and distance knowledge in the time pressure inconsistent condition 
suggests). This finding is broadly consistent with categorization research showing that 
general knowledge can be applied early on during categorization (e.g., Lin & Murphy, 
1997; Luhmann et al., 2006; Palmeri & Blalock, 2000).   
We employed the concurrent task to explore whether the different knowledge 
factors relied on executive resources. Distance factor performance (in the inconsistent 
dual task condition) indicates that this knowledge type can be acquired with diminished 
executive control. No evidence of similarity knowledge was found in the dual task 
condition. Above chance grammaticality performance in this condition showed that it is 
possible to develop grammaticality knowledge with disrupted executive resources (cf. 
Chang & Knowlton, 2004; Higham, 1997).  
We expected the time pressure and dual task to be associated mostly with 
implicit knowledge. These predictions were confirmed only in part. Above chance 
implicit distance knowledge was demonstrated only in the inconsistent condition and 
only in time pressure and dual task conditions. Consistently with Cleeremans and 
Jiménez’s (2002) theory, under speeded stimulus presentation in the inconsistent 
condition, there was not sufficient time to develop ‘quality’ representations 




corresponding to distance knowledge, hence at least part of such knowledge was 
implicit. Also, the finding of implicit distance knowledge in the dual task, inconsistent 
condition is broadly compatible with research showing that divided attention leaves 
implicit knowledge intact (e.g., Dienes et al., 1995; Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Ziori & 
Dienes, 2008). Evidence of implicit knowledge was also found in terms of similarity 
(and not grammaticality), independent of training type.  
The explicit knowledge results, in general, followed the pattern of classification 
results (except for grammaticality). Thus, again the inconsistent condition outperformed 
the consistent one in terms of explicit similarity knowledge (under time pressure) and 
explicit distance knowledge (independent of training type). So, the determining factor 
seemed to be the inconsistency of prior knowledge with structure, with the inconsistent 
condition demonstrating more explicit knowledge than the consistent one, presumably 
because of the greater effort the former condition required.  
4.4 Conclusions 
The main novel aspect of this work is that it is the only AGL study that 
incorporates a knowledge factor, constructed to reflect people’s general knowledge and 
expectations and dissociated from purely structural aspects of the stimuli. More 
specifically, we investigated how (in)congruence of prior knowledge with structure 
affects the development of knowledge concerning both the relevant general knowledge 
(the distance factor) and purely structural information (grammaticality and similarity), 
and we also examined the implicitness and/or explicitness of each of the three 
knowledge types. Congruence of prior knowledge with structure led to an advantage 
only in terms of grammaticality accuracy and only under baseline training, thereby 
replicating Pothos’s (2005) finding. However, a surprising finding is that we identified 
training conditions and knowledge types, such that inconsistency between expectations 




and stimulus structure led to a clear advantage. Finally, we have identified conditions 
where expectations-based knowledge may involve both explicit and implicit knowledge 
and may co-exist with both explicit and implicit knowledge of purely structural aspects. 
The complex pattern of results we identified indicates that, plausibly, the same kind of 
knowledge can be extracted via multiple routes. Clarifying the relevant issues (e.g., the 
interplay between alternative learning routes; Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken & 
Waldron, 1998) in AGL is an under-researched, though important direction for future 









































Table A1.  
The Distance and Chunk Strength Factors For the Test Stimuli, Separately for the G 











MSVS 2* 6.20** MSVSSR 4* 5.00** 
MVRXVS 6 6.44** MVRSSV 5 6.67** 
VXM 4* 1.67 MVXSSX 8 3.44 
VXR 3* 3.67 RRXVXM 7 3.22 
VXRM 5 2.40 RSRMSSR 8 2.82 
VXRR 3* 4.00** RVRXRVS 3* 4.73** 
VXRRM 5 3.14 RXMSVX 6 5.22** 
VXRRR 3* 3.71 RXRMMM 4* 2.78 
VXRRRR 3* 3.56 SVRSX 5 4.71** 
VXRRRRM 5 3.09 SVVSSS 2* 5.56** 
VXRRRRR 3* 3.46 SVVSVM 5 3.33 
VXSSSVS 6 6.36** VRMSVS 4* 5.00** 
VXSSVS 6 5.56** VRRSSM 2* 3.56 
VXSV 5 5.00** VRRVX 2* 3.14 
VXSVS 6 4.00** VRRXSVX 6 5.27** 
VXV 4* 3.33 VRSRXMS 7 3.46 
VXVRXM 7 5.89** VRSSSX 4* 5.22** 
VXVRXRM 8 5.73** VXXRXM 6 2.78 
VXVRXVS 8 5.36** XMMRXSV 8 3.36 
VXVS 5 2.40 XRRVSSS 2* 4.64** 


























Instructions in the consistent condition: “You will see a set of stimuli composed of city 
names. The city names correspond to the routes in Europe of an airplane company on 
successive days (repeated city names indicate that the plane flew to a place very near 
the main city). The routes were planned so as to maximize the efficiency of the trips: 
The secret to success for the specific company is as many trips between nearby cities as 
possible. Short trips are more efficient, as they require less fuel, operation and 
maintenance expenses. Long trips are not that efficient for this company.” The 
instructions in the inconsistent condition were exactly the same, with the following 
difference: “Long trips are more efficient, as the company charges a much higher price 
for long trips without a significant increase in the operation and maintenance expenses 
of its aircrafts. Short trips are not that efficient for this company.” 
 
Test phase: 
“The airline company has found a series of rules to plan its routes. The routes that these 
rules allow are generally more efficient, and the company has been using them for a 
long time. All the routes that you saw in the first part complied with these rules. In this 
part, you will see more routes, some of which comply with these rules and some not. 
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Table 1  
The Association Between Bigram Frequency and Whether it Corresponds to a Short, 
Intermediate, or Long Distance in the MDS Map.  
Training 
bigrams Frequency  
Distance on the 
basis of the MDS 
map 
Problems 
VS 2 Intermediate  
RX 13 Intermediate * 
XR 6 Intermediate  
SV 14 Intermediate * 
MV 6 Long  
VX 4 Long  
RM 1 Long  
XM 1 Long  
XV 4 Long  
XS 4 Long  
MS 10 Short  
VR 13 Short  
RR 5 Short * 
SS 14 Short  
Note. A ‘*’ indicates bigrams such that even though their frequency is high they 
























Table 2  
Percentage of Correct Responses in Terms of the Three Knowledge Types (i.e., 
Grammaticality, Similarity and Distance) in Baseline, Time Pressure and Dual Task 
Conditions, and Whether They Were Significantly Greater Than Chance (50%). 
Knowledge type Consistency 
condition 












59**            
52             
50             
51             
56** 
54*           
  9 
  9 
  9 
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48             
56** 
52 
51             
  8 
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  8 
  8 
  8 



















58**            
57**            
52             
60**            
50             













Note. B refers to a Bayes factor to test the hypothesis that there is learning (represented 
as a half-normal with a SD of 10% above baseline, given that 55-60% performance is 
typically what is achieved by participants in grammars balancing different knowledge 
types; e.g., Vokey & Brooks, 1992). A B of above 3 indicates strong evidence for 
learning and below 1/3 strong evidence for chance performance; a B between 3 and 1/3 
indicates data insensitivity for deciding whether or not there was any learning (see 
Dienes, 2008, 2011). 









Table 3  








































e   7      6 17    15   6     8   7    13 38    17 24    17 
Inconsistent 13    12 15    15   5     8   3      7 39    27 25    22 










13    11 16    13   7    11   5      8 33    25 26    16 
Inconsistent 17    16 22    14 13    17   8    11 22    22 19    19 






k 20    11 28    14 10    10   6      9 16    17 18    16 
Inconsistent 23    19 31    24 11    13   5      9 15    21 16    19 

































Table 4  




Training type % correct judgments             % correct judgments                                          
for implicit attributions       for explicit attributions 












55*         29            14            60**         30             12 
48           30            22            54             30             14 
45           27            19            50             30             11 
52           30            12            51             28             14 
56*         30            13            57**         30             13                                       













51            29           17            56**         30             11 
58*          30           22            61**         30             12 
51            27           19            48             30             11      
55            30           12            62**         28             14 
51            30           13            56*           30             13 













56*          29           16            58**         30             14 
49            30           24            62**         30             15 
47            27           20            52             30             19 
59**        30           12            60**         28             14 
49            30           10            51             30             24 
55*          29           11            63**         27             20 
** p < .01.  * p < .05.     
 
